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Abstract 
 
 
 The price-wedge method yields a tariff-equivalent estimate of technical barriers to trade 
(TBT). An extension of this method accounts for imperfect substitution between domestic and 
imported goods and incorporates recent findings on trade costs. We explore the sensitivity of this 
revamped TBT estimate to its key determinants (substitution elasticity, preference for home 
good, and trade cost). We use the augmented approach to investigate the ongoing US-Japan 
apple trade dispute and find that removing the Japanese TBT would yield limited export gains to 
the United States. We then draw policy implications of our findings. 
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1. Introduction 
Article 20 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) permits governments to set 
their own standards and regulations on trade in order to protect human, animal, or plant life or 
health, provided they do not discriminate among countries or use this motive as concealed 
protectionism. In addition, two specific World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements deal with 
food safety and animal and plant health, and with product standards: the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (SPSA) and the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement 
(TBTA). The SPSA allows countries to set their own standards, but it requires that the standards 
should not arbitrarily discriminate between countries with similar conditions. The TBTA was 
generated to minimize unnecessary obstacles in regulations, standards, and testing and 
certification procedures. In practice, however, some governments use stricter health and safety 
regulations than necessary to isolate domestic producers from international competition. The 
stricter regulations may lead to questionable impediments to imports that compete with domestic 
products, in addition to the existing tariff barriers. When the possibility of a disease or pest 
transmission is very low or threat to food safety is small, these trade impediments often cause 
welfare losses for importing countries and mercantilist losses for exporting countries due to 
reduced exports. 
 These issues have of course attracted the attention of economists (Anderson, McRae, and 
Wilson; Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina; Josling, Roberts, and Orden; Roberts and Krissoff). The 
growing literature on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations and other technical barriers to 
trade (TBT) often uses a price-wedge approach1 to quantify the impact of a barrier on market 
equilibrium and trade (see, for example, Calvin and Krissoff; and Campbell and Gossette). 
                                                          
1 The price wedge measures the difference between the internal price of a good and the reference price of a 
comparable good, such as a border price. It attributes the price difference to trade barriers and transportation cost. 
The price wedge can be expressed as a specific tax/tariff, or an ad valorem tax/tariff (Beghin and Bureau).  
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Although not unique or sophisticated, the method has been legitimized in the economics 
literature with some prescriptions and qualifiers to account for transportation cost and quality 
differences (Baldwin; Deardorff and Stern). The use of a price-wedge approach often abstracts 
from quality differences or simply addresses the difference by choosing “close” substitutes. 
Transportation costs may be reduced to the CIF-FOB differential and abstract from the internal 
transportation cost once imports are landed. All price-wedge estimates we are aware of rely on 
the assumption of homogeneous commodities and a price arbitrage condition. By assuming that 
domestic and imported goods are perfect substitutes, the gap between their prices reflects trade 
impediments from various policies and natural protection. Border tariffs and transportation and 
transaction costs prevent full arbitrage between the two prices (Head and Mayer). Hence, in 
principle, the price gap can yield an estimate of the tariff equivalent of the TBT once 
transportation and trade costs and other impediments have been taken into account. 
 In this paper we derive a revamped tariff-equivalent estimate of a TBT. We extend the 
price-wedge framework by first relaxing the homogeneous commodity assumption, a 
straightforward but instrumental step overlooked in the literature on TBT measurement. We 
account explicitly for commodity heterogeneity and perceived quality of substitutes. Next, we 
incorporate recent developments and findings on large and costly border effects arising from 
transportation, linguistic differences, and poor infrastructure and law enforcement (Anderson and 
van Wincoop; Head and Mayer; Hummels and Skiba). Two major findings of this new literature 
are particularly relevant to our work. First, trading costs are very large and often greater than 
policy impediments and cannot be ignored. While CIF/FOB ratios have fallen over time, other 
transportation and trade costs have remained high and have been underestimated. Second, these 
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costs are structured on a per-unit basis rather than following the so-called iceberg method;2 they 
act as a specific tariff rather than an ad valorem tax (Hummels and Skiba). These per-unit costs 
shift supply in a parallel manner rather than proportionally, which influences the estimate of the 
TBT. We provide a consistent approach to apportion the internal-border price difference between 
potential sources of the difference (quality and heterogeneity of goods, border tariff, TBT, 
transportation and other transaction costs). This approach allows us to elucidate the respective 
role of each source leading to a credible estimate of the tariff equivalent of the TBT.  
 We systematically explore the robustness of the tariff-equivalent estimate to underlying 
assumptions on commodity heterogeneity, home-good preference, trading costs, and the chosen 
reference data. We show the importance of selecting best values of these key determinants 
(substitution elasticity, home-good preference, and trade cost) on which the policy analysis can 
be centered. We then analyze the sensitivity of the TBT estimate around these central values of 
the determinants and associated welfare implications. The analysis shows the value of narrowing 
the set of possible estimates of the TBT using available data and knowledge on the quality and 
heterogeneity of the domestic and competing imported goods. 
 Our paper bridges two methods often used to estimate the trade effects of TBT: the tariff-
equivalent–price-wedge approach mentioned previously and the gravity-equation approach.3 
Recent conceptual developments have provided theoretical foundations to the gravity-equation 
approach and account explicitly for relative prices of traded and domestic substitutes and for 
trading costs. In addition, they attempt to better measure and decompose “border effects” of trade 
barriers and transportation costs between trade partners. These new approaches have been 
                                                          
2 The iceberg method refers to transportation cost being proportional to the value of a good. To ship a unit value of a 
good it takes (1+x%) unit value of that good to be shipped out. Transportation cost is equal to x% of the unit value 
of the good and “melts” away. 
3 The gravity equation approach links trade flows between two countries to observable variables such as their 
relative income, and to variables inhibiting trade such as distance, linguistic barriers, and trade policy barriers 
(Anderson and van Wincoop). 
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applied to aggregate trade data but not to individual commodities (Anderson and van Wincoop; 
Head and Mayer).  
 Calvin and Krissoff provide a tariff equivalent of phytosanitary barriers in the Japanese 
apple market regarding the risk of contamination by fire blight that has been the origin of a long 
WTO dispute between the US and Japan (WTO 2002-2004). The dispute has attracted much 
attention. Calvin and Krissoff use the law of one price under a homogeneous commodity 
assumption (arbitrage condition) to calculate the tariff equivalent of SPS barriers affecting apple 
imports in Japan to avoid damages from fire blight. By assuming that Japan’s domestic apples 
and imported apples are perfect substitutes, the gap between the prices of domestic and imported 
apples accounts for the border tariff and other trade impediments that prevent full arbitrage. The 
latter authors also abstract from other border effects (internal transportation and transaction 
costs), leading to a likely overstatement of the cost of a TBT barrier, other things being equal. 
They use several reference years to mitigate annual variations in the reference data used to 
calibrate the tariff equivalent to the TBT. Using recent data and the proposed revamped 
approach, we provide a new investigation of the Japan-US apple dispute. We compute the tariff 
equivalent of Japanese TBT regulations affecting apple trade and quantify the impact of 
removing these policies on welfare and apple trade flows. We also draw policy implications. The 
apple dispute offers an opportunity to validate our contention that departures from perfect 
substitution and significant trade costs have a substantial impact on the estimate of SPS/TBT 
regulation and hence on welfare and policy implications derived from this estimate. 
2. Analytical Framework 
As in the gravity equation, we use the simple constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model to 
incorporate the heterogeneity of goods in consumers’ preferences and eventually to calculate the 
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tariff equivalent estimate of a TBT (Hummels and Skiba). Define domestic and imported apples, 
D and I. We assume the case of a small country facing a parametric exogenous world price of 
imports. The price PD of the domestic good is determined by the domestic good market 
equilibrium, as explained later in the paper. The representative consumer maximizes utility U 
subject to a budget constraint:  
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where TM  is expenditure on all goods; ρα ,  are parameters reflecting preferences; and pD and pI 
are consumer prices of the two goods D and I. AOG is the aggregate numéraire good. Home-
good preference implies α > ½. The corresponding indirect utility function deriving from 
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1
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with ρσ −= 1
1  being the elasticity of substitution and *AOG being the optimal consumption 
amount of the numéraire. Parameter α functions as a quality shift (Hummels and Klenow), which 
(2)
(1)
(3)
(4)
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lowers the effective price of D and increases its consumption, other things being equal. It has the 
opposite effects on I, increasing its effective price and decreasing its consumption. Observable 
price-quantity pairs and some additional information to select α and σ can be used to infer the 
tariff-equivalent estimate of the TBT and the interface between α and the tariff-equivalent 
estimate of the TBT.  
 The TBT first leads to a higher marginal production cost and process cost such as orchard 
and harvest inspections and buffer requirements (measured as 1TBT ). This first part of the TBT 
leads to a higher price of apples exported to Japan because of a shift in the marginal cost for the 
apples going to Japan (Calvin, Krissoff, and Foster). In addition, strict inspection requirements, 
vendor and ordering issues, and additional requirements are added to the imported price once the 
apples are landed in Japan. Variable 2TBT  represents these costs in the market channel, which 
have been noted in the case of Japan (Gehrt et al.). Therefore the import price Ip  is expressed as 
1 2I US R R US T R Rp p TBT TBT IT Tariff T p TBT IT Tariff T= + + + + + = + + + + , 
where price pUS represents the price/cost of US apples going elsewhere than Japan, RIT is the 
insurance and freight and other international trade costs of apples exported to Japan, Tariff  is 
the specific import tariff, RT  is the per-unit transportation and transaction cost from the harbor to 
the wholesale internal market, and TBTT is the tariff equivalent of the two components of the 
TBT (TBTT = TBT1 + TBT2), respectively.  
From utility maximization, we know that the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the 
relative price of the substitute goods, or  
RRTUS
D
I
D
I
D
TTariffITTBTp
p
p
p
MU
MUMRS ++++=== , 
where MRS is the marginal rate of substitution, and MUj indicates the marginal utility of good j. 
(5)
(6)
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From (6), the tariff equivalent of the TBT, TTBT , is solved after deriving the MRS from (1) and 
substituting it back into (6). TTBT  is a function of the relative cost of the two goods, their 
volumes, the elasticity of substitution, the preference parameter, international trade costs, 
internal transaction and transportation cost, and border tariff: 4 5 
RRUSDT TTariffITpI
DpTBT −−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−= σα
α 11 . 
 Equation (7) nests the conventional technique that assumes perfect substitutes leading to 
the TBT in order to explain the differential between the domestic price and international price 
adjusted for transportation. To see this, assume α = ½ and let σ → ∞.6 Then the tariff-equivalent 
estimate of the TBT is ( )T D US R RTBT p p IT T Tariff= − − + − . If the tariff and TBT are removed, 
the latter expression will lead to the arbitrage condition pD = pCIF, with pCIF =pUS + (ITR + TR). In 
real life these two prices would differ because of quality differences and imperfect 
substitutability. To measure the sensitivity of TTBT  to preference/quality, imperfect 
substitutability, and transportation cost, we compute the sensitivity elasticities of the TBT 
estimate with respect to σ , α , and transportation cost in the empirical section.  
                                                          
4 Other functional forms (rather than the CES) can be used. They lead to slightly different specifications of equation 
(7). The CES is flexible, with a wide range of possible substitution between D and I. To illustrate alternatives, a 
linear- expenditure system (LES) specification leads to 
1
1 ( )
11 ( )
DDD DTBT p p IT Tariff TT D US R RII I I
αα γ
αα γ
−⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟= − − − −⎜ ⎟−− ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
, with minimum 
subsistence parameters γj and preference parameters αj (j = D, I) to be identified with extraneous information. 
5 The ad valorem tariff equivalent is 
1
1% pp D USDTBT it t tT R Rp I pCIF CIF
α σ
α
− ⎛ ⎞= − − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , where t  is the ad alorem tariff,  itR is the  
ad alorem tariff equivalent of international transportation, insurance, and transaction cost, and tR is the internal 
transportation and transaction cost. 
6 We thank a referee for suggesting this nesting. 
(7)
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 For the welfare analysis, we use the usual Equivalent Variation (EV) measure of the 
consumer’s welfare, with 010 ),~( mupeEV −= , where ),(~ ID ppp =  and subscripts 0 and 1 
indicate initial and new prices. 
We use a small displacement model to determine the price of domestic apples and 
eventually infer the impact of removing the TBT barrier on imports and domestic market 
equilibrium. Let S be the retail supply of domestic apples, which is an increasing function of 
domestic apple price and exogenous parameter λ:  
= SεD DS( p ,λ ) λp , 
where εS represents the own-price elasticity of the domestic apple supply. Decreases in parameter 
λ would reflect upward shifts in supply if contamination occurs and induces an increase in the 
cost of production. Using equations (4) and (8) the equilibrium domestic price eDp  and quantity 
are determined by the market equilibrium condition, or 
=e eD I DD( p , p ) S( p ,λ ) . 
Equations (4), (7), and (8), and condition (9) constitute the model. With the elimination 
of the TBT, Ip  decreases and pD will fall if there is no risk of contamination from the increased 
imports. The demand for domestic products declines with the change in pI. Then the domestic 
market adjusts at a lower price such that demand equals supply. Imports expand as the direct 
effect of the decrease in the import price is larger than the feedback effect of the lower domestic 
price, by stability. If contamination occurs, the price of domestic apples may not decrease, as the 
domestic supply shifts upward to reflect the increased cost from contamination. The domestic 
apple equilibrium quantity is further reduced by the contamination. Imports increase. For 
simplicity, we assume away feedback effects from apple suppliers into the income of the 
(8)
(9)
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representative consumer. We turn next to our investigation of the Japan-US apple dispute starting 
with some key stylized facts on the dispute. 
3. The Japan-US Apple Dispute 
The high technical barriers to importing apples into Japan have brought repeated complaints 
from several exporting countries and have led to a 30-year dispute (Elms). The latest episode of 
this dispute has been taking place within the WTO. Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Apples (WTO, 2002-2004) relates to the United States’ complaint about the Japanese 
requirements imposed on apples imported from the United States and their inconsistency with 
WTO principles. The prohibitions and requirements included, for example, the prohibition of 
imported apples from states other than designated areas in Oregon and Washington; the 
prohibition of imported apples from any orchard (whether it is free of fire blight or not) if fire 
blight was detected within a 500-meter buffer zone surrounding such orchard; the requirement 
that export orchards be inspected three times a year (at blossom, fruitlet, and harvest stages) to 
check if fire blight is present in order to apply the aforementioned prohibitions; the requirement 
that at the post-harvest stage apples for export to Japan be separated from fruits for export to 
other markets; and chlorination of apples for export to Japan.  
In 1997, the United States requested that Japan modify its import restrictions on apples 
based on published scientific evidence that mature, symptomless apples are not carriers of fire 
blight. In 2000, the United States agreed to carry out joint research proposed by Japan to confirm 
the results of those earlier studies. The USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and 
Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) conducted the joint research. The 
research results confirmed that mature, symptomless apples are not carriers of fire blight. This 
finding provided additional scientific support for the US position. Since the results of this 
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research were released in February 2001, the US government has repeatedly pressured Japan to 
modify its import restrictions. After extensive bilateral discussions with USDA scientists, Japan 
refused to modify its import restrictions in October 2001. 
In March 2002, the United States requested WTO consultations concerning Japan’s 
import restrictions on US apples. Consultations in April 2002 failed to settle the dispute. In May 
2002, the United States requested that the WTO establish a panel to consider the Japanese 
restrictions. In June 2002, a panel was established by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the 
WTO to consider this issue. Before the panel, the United States claimed that Japan was acting 
inconsistently with some articles of the SPSA, certain articles of the Agreement on Agriculture, 
and the so-called GATT 1994. In July 2003, the panel found that Japan’s phytosanitary measures 
were maintained without sufficient scientific evidence and inconsistent with Japan’s obligation, 
did not qualify as a provisional measure, and were not based on a risk assessment. In September 
2003, Japan appealed the WTO panel ruling. In addition to Japan’s appeal, the United States 
cross-appealed the panel report. At the same time, third participants, such as Australia, Brazil, 
the European Union, and New Zealand, filed their submissions. After more investigations, in 
November 2003, the DSB upheld the findings of July 2003. Therefore, the Appellate Body 
recommended that the DSB request that Japan bring its inconsistent measures into conformity 
with SPSA.  
Half a year later, in July 2004, the United States held that Japan failed to comply with the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB by the end of the reasonable period of time. Therefore, 
the United States requested that the DSB establish a panel and simultaneously requested 
authorization on suspension of concessions and other obligations in one or more of the 
following: tariff concessions and related obligations under the GATT 1994 on a list of products; 
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and concessions and other obligations under the SPS Agreement and the Agreement on 
Agriculture. Because Japan objected to the United States’ suspension request, this matter has 
been referred to arbitration. Because of the need to consult scientific experts, the arbitration 
panel completed its report in June 2005, which is being circulated now. 
Between 1971 and 1992, Japan imported only 4,500 boxes of apples, all from South 
Korea and North Korea. In June of 1993, Japan permitted some import of New Zealand apples. 
After that, the United States and Australia also exported apples to Japan but not continuously 
over time. New Zealand, EU, and Korean apples have fire blight or a related form. Australia and 
Chile have been free of fire blight. Although Japan opened its door to foreign apples meeting the 
SPS and TBT standards regarding fire blight, the importing quantity has been quite low 
compared with the domestic production. As shown in Table 1, the import shares never exceeded 
0.35% between 2000 and 2002, the last period prior the constitution of the dispute panel. The 
low import share is partly due to the high tariff and TBT barrier increasing the cost of exporting 
to Japan.  
Table 1. Japanese Apple Production and Imports 
Source of data: Japan Customs, USDA.  
Note: MT denotes metric tons. 
 
In addition to the high technical barrier referred to in the dispute, the higher quality of the 
domestic product cannot be neglected. Fruits in general and apples in particular are an important 
part of the Japanese diet (Huang). Japanese consumers exhibit a strong home-good preference 
relative to imported apples. This fact has been repeatedly established (American University; 
Domestic Wholesale Import 
Year USP  
(yen/kg) 
Domestic 
Production 
(MT) 
Quantity 
(MT) 
Price 
(yen/kg) 
Quantity 
(MT) 
CIF Price 
(yen/kg) 
Import 
Share 
2000 149 799600 691600 238 594 156 0.09% 
2001 129 930700 674600 246 2339 126 0.35% 
2002 139 925800 768700 182 120 237 0.02% 
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Kajikawa; Shim, Gehrt and Lotz; USDA). According to Japanese consumers, domestic apples 
have a higher quality because of their sweeter flavor and bigger size. For instance, after Japan 
opened its apple market to imports in 1995, US apples entered Japan at much lower prices than 
Japanese domestic products. However, after an initial success, the sales of US apples declined 
because Japanese consumers complained that US apples were too sour and did not cater to 
Japanese tastes (American University). Japanese consumers prefer apples with brix (a measure of 
sugar level) in a certain range and a specific brix-to-acid ratio. But imported apples do not meet 
these requirements. In addition, imports are smaller in size and less juicy (Kajikawa). For 
Japanese consumers who believe that apples must have an appropriate brix and acid level, 
firmness, juice, size, and flavor, imported apples cannot be a perfect substitute for domestic 
products.  
Japanese farmers produce apples with great care and the production of apples is labor 
intensive. Leaves near each apple are usually plucked away when the fruit is still on the tree, 
which ensures that the apple receives enough and balanced sunlight to ensure full ripening. 
Several weeks before harvesting, bags are used to protect individual apples in order to prevent 
any kind of surface marring. This labor-intensive production leads to a higher quality and at the 
same time comes at a higher cost. Because of the quality difference and trade barriers, Japanese 
producers are able to pass the higher costs to consumers in the form of a higher price. Hence, the 
trade barriers do not explain the entire price wedge. A price differential reflecting the quality 
premium would remain under free trade. In addition, as a fresh fruit, the internal transportation 
cost for apples is high and cannot be ignored. 
4. Quantifying the Apple Dispute 
We apply the framework developed in section 2 to imported apples in Japan. We use all 
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imported apples to estimate I and the average import unit cost measured as the CIF price, shown 
in Table 1, and to compute the tariff equivalent of the Japanese TBT regulations. 7 Then we 
estimate the impact of eliminating the TBT. The transportation and transaction cost, including 
both international and internal cost, ITR+TR, is approximately 78.33 yen/kg (Calvin, Krissoff, 
and Foster). The tariff rate is listed in Table 2 in specific form (17% of PCIF). We analyze long-
run and short-run impacts. As in Calvin and Krissoff, the long-run supply elasticity of domestic 
apples is assumed to be 1, whereas the short-run supply elasticity is assumed to be 0.1. We use 
Washington State size-88 waxed extra fancy Fuji apples as similar apples exported to Japan and 
take their price as the USp  (USDA).
8 We choose size-88 apples since Japanese consumers prefer 
apples of a bigger size. We follow the estimate of the Queensland (Australia) Department of 
Primary Industries and Fisheries (Queensland Government) and assume that with the 
transmission of pests and disease the production of apples would decrease by a fixed proportion 
of 20% with the TBT in place. We use 2SLS to estimate the parameter values for σ  and α  with 
monthly data for the period 2000-2004 (see Appendix 1). The estimated result forσ  is 7.12 with 
a standard deviation of 2.09; the estimated result forα  is 0.64 with a standard deviation of 0.05.9 
4.1. TBT Estimate and Sensitivity Analysis 
The last two columns of Table 2 show the actual tariff (in yen/kg) and (specific) tariff equivalent 
of the TBT across different reference years when σ  and α  are assigned to be 7.12 and 0.64 
respectively.  
                                                          
7. In an alternative specification, we treat imports from different countries as imperfect substitutes using a double-
nested CES model and calculate the TBT estimate. Results are quite similar to what we present in this paper. For 
example, when we assume α =0.64, the elasticity of substitution among imports as 10, and σ =7.12, %TBTT is 65%, 
which is quite close to the 60% level obtained by aggregating all imports into one good. 
8 We follow Calvin and Krissoff, except we choose bigger apples (see their footnotes 4 and 5).  
9 Shim, Gehrt, and Lotz. (2002) provide an implicit value of α =0.55 based on a survey of Japanese housewives on 
their preferences of US and Japanese apples. The latter estimate is smaller than our econometric estimate but within 
its confidence interval. As we use total apple imports to derive our econometric estimate of α, this difference in data 
(all imports versus US apple imports) may contribute to the difference in the estimates of α. 
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Table 2. TTBT  Across Different Years (σ =7.12, α =0.64)10 
Year Tariff (yen/kg) 
TTBT  
(yen/kg) 
2000 26.52 93.86 
2001 21.47 71.02 
2002 40.29 92.87 
Source: WTO schedules and Japan Customs. 
 
To test the sensitivity of TTBT  to the elasticity of substitution σ  and domestic 
preference/quality parameterα , we assign the central values of their estimates and consider their 
confidence intervals (central values plus/minus one and then two standard deviations). The TBT 
estimates are shown in Table 3.  
Table 4 gives the elasticity of TTBT  with respect to σ  (i.e., σε ), holding α  constant. 
Measures of σε  show that TTBT  is sensitive to σ , especially when the value of σ  is low (poor 
substitutes). For example, when σ =2.94, σε  is less than -1.35, a value which indicates TTBT  
would differ a lot even if the change in σ  was to be small. Thus, σ  plays an important role in 
the calculation of TTBT . When σ  gets larger, the sensitivity decreases in absolute value. When 
σ =11.3, the sensitivity is about a fourth of what it is for σ =2.94.  
Table 4 also gives the elasticity of TTBT  with respect to α  (holding σ  constant); TTBT  
is highly sensitive to α  for the smaller values of α, but this sensitivity decreases as α increases. 
It is about four times smaller for α=0.74 compared with α=0.54. Good information on α appears 
to be critical in estimating TTBT . This fact has implications for gravity equation analyses, which 
often impose α =0.5. This restriction may strongly bias the estimates of impediments to trade, as 
the sensitivity of TBTT with respect to α is at its highest at α =0.5. 
                                                          
10 The ad valorem estimated values of %TBTT  for the three years are 60%, 56%, and 39%, respectively. 
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Table 3. TTBT  Under Different Values of σ  and α  
α  σ  TTBT  
(yen/kg) 
2.94 1970.68 
5.03 558.07 
7.12 279.48 
9.21 169.38 
0.54 
11.3 111.70 
2.94 1558.44 
5.03 406.07 
7.12 178.81 
9.21 88.99 
 
0.59 
 
11.30 41.93 
2.94 1210.61 
5.03 277.83 
7.12 93.86 
9.21 21.16 
0.64 
11.3 --- 
2.94 913.19 
5.03 168.16 
7.12 21.23 
9.21 --- 
0.69 
11.30 --- 
2.94 655.96 
5.03 73.32 
7.12 --- 
9.21 --- 
0.74 
11.30 --- 
Notes: Bold font denotes central values of α and σ. The shaded area 
denotes the central case (σ =7.12, α =0.64); --- denotes TBTT negative, 
which is of no economic importance. (Analysis is for year 2000.)  
 
 
Table 4. Elasticity of TTBT  with Respect to σ  and α  
σ  σε  
(α =0.64) α  
αε  
(σ =7.12)
2.94 -1.351 0.54 -2.376 
4.33 -0.917 0.57 -1.885 
5.72 -0.694 0.60 -1.508 
7.12 -0.558 0.64 -1.130 
8.52 -0.466 0.67 -0.913 
9.92 -0.400 0.70 -0.737 
11.3 -0.351 0.74 -0.551 
Notes: The shaded area denotes the results for 
central value of parameters. (Analysis is for 
year 2000.) 
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Estimates of the elasticity of TTBT  with respect to transportation cost RT + RIT  show that 
TTBT  is sensitive to RT + RIT  when the latter gets large but goes to zero as RT + RIT  decreases 
(estimates available from the authors, and provided here as Appendix Table A4). Around the 
central value (78.33 yen/kg) used in our computation, the elasticity of TTBT  to RT + RIT  is 
approximately -0.18 and hence plays some role in the calculation of the TTBT , although less 
crucial than the that of the taste parameters. The elasticity of TTBT  with respect to the domestic 
and imported quantities shows TTBT  is less sensitive to the domestic and imported quantities 
than it is to their prices (see Appendix Table A4). The moderate elasticities remain nearly 
constant as quantity levels (D and I) change. In contrast, the elasticity of TTBT  with respect to 
the domestic price is always greater than one and gets larger as the domestic price increases (see 
Appendix Table A4). The elasticity of TTBT  with respect to Tariff indicates that the sensitivity of 
TTBT  goes up as the value of the tariff increases, although all of the estimated values are less 
than 0.45 (in absolute value) for Tariff, ranging from 18.7 to 46.8 yen/kg (see Appendix Table 
A4). 
4.2 Welfare Analysis of the TBT (and Tariff) Removal 
The import increases induced by policy reforms are shown in Table 5 for different values of σ  
and α . By eliminating the TBT (alone and along with the border tariff elimination), apple 
imports would increase substantially, between 5.24 and 218.11 thousand metric tons (tmt), 
depending on home-good preference parameter α  and the assumed elasticity of substitution. 
These magnitudes are in a range of values comparable to those of Calvin and Krissoff. These 
larger imports remain moderate relative to domestic apple consumption. Japan imports apples 
from Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States. The US share of apple 
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imports by Japan has varied widely over time. In 2000, the value share of US apples to total 
apple imports was 24%. Based on the 2000 share, when σ =7.12 and α =0.64, by elimination of 
both the TBT and the tariff, the expansion of US imports by Japan would amount to only 
US$4.01 million and would not exceed US$75.73 million, if one assumes σ =2.94 and 
α =0.54.11 The losses to US exporters and producers would be smaller than the value of imports, 
first because they would be valued at lower FOB prices and farmgate prices, respectively, and 
because producer surplus losses are always smaller than the gross value of forgone production 
opportunities. The US$75.73 million figure is about half of the lost exports claimed by the 
United States at the WTO (US$143.4 million). 
Table 5. Increase in Imports (tmt) with the Elimination of TBT (and Tariff) ( 1=sε ) 
α  σ  Increase in Imports by Elimination of TBT Increase in Imports by Elimination of TBT and Tariff 
2.94 174.46 218.11 
7.12 71.15 118.26 
 
0.54 
 11.30 29.95 70.77 
2.94 75.40 98.79 
7.12 5.24 11.56 
 
0.64 
 11.30 --- --- 
2.94 22.28 30.20 
7.12 --- --- 
 
0.74 
 11.30 --- --- 
Notes: --- denotes TBTT  is negative, which is of no economic importance. The shaded area denotes the central 
case. (Analysis is for year 2000.) 
 
 Changes in welfare with elimination of the TBT and the tariff vary under different 
assumptions on the transmission of disease. Transmission of disease implies an upward shift of 
the domestic supply of apples because the variable cost of producing apples has increased. Table 
6 shows the welfare implications of eliminating the TBT and the tariff for 2000, when assigning 
different values to α  and σ , assuming transportation plus transaction costs of 78.33 yen/kg, 
                                                          
11 The incremental US$4.01 million of US imports come from the 2000 US value share of all apple imports by 
Japan, or 22,249,000/92,630,000=24%, applied to the expansion in import value (11.56 TMT *155.91 yen/kg), 
expressed in US$ with an exchange rate of 107.765 yen/$. 
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1=sε  (long-run response), and under the condition of no disease transmission. Table 6 shows 
that the EV and the producer’s surplus change dramatically with the changes to σ  and α . 
However, when there is no disease transmission, EV net of tariff revenue loss is greater than the 
loss of the producer’s surplus for both elimination of the TBT and elimination of the TBT and 
the tariff no matter what values σ  and α  take.  
Table 6. Welfare Analysis with Elimination of the TBT (and Tariff) 
( 1=sε , Without Disease Transmission) 
Welfare Impact of TBTT Removal Welfare Impact of TBTT +Tariff Removal 
α  σ  Tariff 
Revenue 
Change (1) 
EV 
(2) 
Producer 
Surplus Loss
(3) 
Net Welfare
(1)+(2)-(3) 
 
EV 
(4) 
Producers 
Surplus Loss 
(5) 
Net Welfare 
(4)-(5) 
2.94 7760 62839 22593 48006 73958 25276 48681 
7.12 3180 13239 9050 7370 20914 13554 7361 0.54 
11.3 1354 4466 3603 2216 10532 8073 2458 
2.94 3369 22067 9705 15731 26636 11385 15251 
7.12 259 767 597 429 1549 1156 392 0.64 
11.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
2.94 1014 5444 2523 3935 7017 3334 3683 
7.12 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.74 
11.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Notes: Welfare is measured in million yen (2000 prices). --- denotes TBTT not being defined. 
The shaded area indicates the central case. 
 
 
 Table 7 shows the welfare implications with disease transmission, holding other 
conditions the same as in the previous analysis. When σ =7.12 and α =0.54, the net welfare is 
positive. So it is optimal to eliminate either the TBT or both the TBT and tariff in this case. But 
when the value of α  is equal to or larger than 0.64, EV plus the change in tariff revenues do not 
exceed the loss of producer’s surplus and net welfare consequences of the reform are negative no 
matter what value σ  takes on. So the elimination of the TBT may not improve welfare. The 
same logic applies to the case when both the TBT and the tariff are eliminated.  
 Table 8 gives the short-run welfare implications of policy reforms for the case without 
disease transmission when supply of domestic apples is assumed to be very inelastic ( 1.0=sε ). 
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Supply expansion of perennials takes time, although at the margin apples can be moved from one 
use to another (from processing to fresh market) on short notice. Supply contraction is more 
responsive since apples can be removed from the market and stored. In any case, it is interesting 
to consider the implications of the less-price-responsive supply of domestic apples. As expected, 
the decrease in domestic price caused by the domestic demand shift is more pronounced with this 
Table 7. Welfare Analysis with Elimination of TBT (and Tariff) 
( 1=sε , With Disease Transmission) 
Welfare Impact of TBTT Removal Welfare Impact of TBTT +Tariff Removal
α  σ  Tariff 
Revenue 
Change (1) 
EV 
(2) 
Producer 
Surplus Loss
(3) 
Net Welfare
(1)+(2)-(3) 
 
EV 
(4) 
Producers 
Surplus Loss 
(5) 
Net Welfare 
(4)-(5) 
2.94 8739 49311 25323 32727 60850 28165 32685 
7.12 4791 1713 13676 -7173 11045 19245 -8200 0.54 
11.3 2908 -7637 8262 -12990 855 14614 -13758 
2.94 3984 6589 11305 -732 11613 13336 -1723 
7.12 496 -15938 1060 -16502 -14442 2443 -16884 0.64 
11.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
2.94 1235 -11016 3258 -13039 -9420 4102 -13522 
7.12 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.74 
11.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Notes: Welfare is measured in million yen (2000 prices). --- denotes TBTT not being defined. 
The shaded area indicates the central case. 
 
 
Table 8. Short-Run Welfare Analysis with Elimination of TBT (and Tariff) 
( 1.0=sε , Without Disease Transmission) 
Welfare Impact of TBTT Removal Welfare Impact of TBTT +Tariff Removal
α  σ  Tariff 
Revenue 
Change (1) 
EV 
(2) 
Producer 
Surplus 
Loss 
(3) 
Net Welfare
(1)+(2)-(3)
EV 
(4) 
Producers 
Surplus 
Loss 
(5) 
Net Welfare 
(4)-(5) 
2.94 6844 78060 35670 49234 91231 39840 51391 
7.12 2714 17904 13638 6980 27052 19660 7392 0.54 
11.3 1213 6289 5387 2114 14130 11717 2413 
2.94 3129 29296 16379 16047 34942 10484 24458 
7.12 255 1183 968 469 2523 1273 1250 0.64 
11.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
2.94 990 7571 4560 4001 9739 5939 3800 
7.12 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.74 
11.3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Notes: Welfare is measured in million yen (2000 prices). --- denotes TBTT not being defined. 
The shaded area indicates the central case. 
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steeper domestic supply curve. Accordingly, EV (columns 2 and 4) increases relative to its level 
in the long-run case; imports and associated tariff revenues (column 1) do not expand as much; 
and the loss of producer surplus is more acute with this inelastic supply. Net welfare gains are 
mitigated by the larger losses of producer surplus. 
 Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the variation of estimates of long-run net welfare and import 
effects from removing the TBT as σ  and α  change and without disease transmission. The net 
welfare is EV plus change in tariff revenue net of loss of producer’s surplus. The transparent 
horizontal plate is the zero plate, provided for reference. Figures 1 and 2 show that the net 
welfare and increase in imports increase as σ  and α  decrease. They decrease faster when σ  
and α  are smaller (the surfaces are concave toward the origin [σ =α =0]). The net welfare 
eventually approaches zero when σ  and α  take on larger values. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we revamped the tariff equivalent of a TBT by relaxing the homogeneous 
commodity assumption, accounting for perceived quality of substitutes and trade costs. The latter 
are often larger than policy impediments and cannot be abstracted from them. Transportation and 
trade costs are structured on a per-unit basis rather than being ad valorem. Specific (as opposed 
to proportional) trade costs reduce the variability of the estimate of TBT with respect to the 
variability of import unit value across different reference years. Their influence on the TBT 
estimate is mitigated as the import unit value increases. Trade costs and imperfect substitution 
have offsetting influences in the computation of the estimate of the TBT. Since most previous 
applications have ignored these two aspects, these previous applications have somewhat 
mitigated the error implied by the two simplifications and dissimulated the inherent sensitivity of 
the TBT estimate to each of these underlying parameters.  
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Figure 1. Sensitivity of Net Welfare (EV+Tariff Revenue-Loss of Producers’ Surplus) to σ  
and α  with Elimination of TBT (Without Disease Transmission) ( sε =1) 
 
Note: For visual simplicity, the net welfare measure where TBTT is not defined is set to be zero.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Increase in Imports’ Sensitivity to σ  and α  with Elimination of the TBT (in tmt) 
 
Note: For visual simplicity, the net welfare measure where TBTT is not defined is set to be zero.  
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The rigorous investigation of the Japan-US apple dispute first validates the approach and 
indicates the importance of empirical estimates of the magnitude of preferences (α and σ), which 
we estimated econometrically. We then explored the sensitivity of the tariff equivalent estimate 
of the TBT with respect to these two parameters, varying their value around the central estimates 
we had obtained. The TBT estimate and welfare analysis based on it are sensitive to these 
parameters. The sensitivity to the consumers’ home preference has some implications for gravity 
equation models that impose restrictions of equal preference/quality for imported and domestic 
goods. These models are likely to provide biased measures of trade impediments and should 
relax this assumption.  
More importantly, our research raises interesting policy implications. A striking result in 
the analysis of the apple dispute is that the increase in apple imports would be small (in value) no 
matter what parameter estimates are used. It appears that the alleged damage in lost exports 
claimed by the United States at the WTO (US$143.4 million) is substantially overstated. The 
political economy of the case is also intriguing. Much political goodwill has been spent on this 
dispute relative to the small size of the potential direct gains in agricultural exports. Ancillary 
benefits may exist if the United States eventually succeeds in opening the Japanese market and 
establishes a reputation as a persistent negotiator. Other countries or protected industries may 
pay attention to the United States’ resolve in opening markets and may refrain from engaging in 
costly disputes.  
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Appendix 1. Estimation of Parameters σ  and α  
 
 
The derivation process for the elasticity of substitution σ  and home-good preference 
parameterα  is as follows. First, divide equation (2) by equation (3), then solve for Ip  to get 
DI pI
Dp α
ασ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= 1
1
. 
Since we do not observe Ip  directly (because it is also a function of TBTT), we substitute Ip  
into equation (2) and rearrange terms to obtain 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=−
−
α
ασ 11
11
D
I
Dp
M
D
, 
where M is the expenditure on all apples. I is the aggregate imports since the individual imports 
from each country are too small to derive the parameters. We set M to be the expenditure on 
domestic apples plus the CIF price inclusive of import tariff, and RT  times the imported quantity 
I plus an assumed small 2TBT  (as 5% of the CIF price). The approximation of 2TBT  does not 
have much influence on the estimation of the parameters since the expenditure on imported 
apples is less than 0.35% of the total expenditure on average. (I* 2TBT ) represents a very small 
percentage of the expenditure on all apples. We have varied 2TBT  from zero to 10% of the CIF 
price, and the estimation results remain close to the 5% case.  
After taking natural logarithms, (A2) becomes 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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⎛ −=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛ − α
α
σ
1lnln111ln
D
I
Dp
M
D
. 
Given a series of 2000-2004 monthly data of M, D, I, and Dp  from Monthly Statistics of Japan, 
Japan Customs; and MAFF, we run two-stage least-square regression (2SLS) on (A3) since the 
right-hand-side variable ( )ln /I D  is endogenously determined.12 Using the regression 
coefficient of ( )ln /I D  and intercept, we recover σ  and α . We have 42 data points since for 
some of the months the imports are zero. Since I/D and apple expenditure are endogenous, we 
develop an instrument for ( )ln /I D  using exogenous price CIFp  and the Japanese real wage 
index, RWI , and years dummy variables in the first stage. We regress ( )ln /I D on year dummy 
variables year1 (2000), year2 (2001 and so on), year3, year4, CIFp , 
2
CIFp , RWI , and 
2RWI . The 
results of the instrument estimation are shown in Table A1. 
                                                          
12  The Hausman Test was conducted, and the P-value for the test found to be <0.01, so ( )ln /I D  is endogenous. 
The estimation procedure used addresses the endogeneity.  
(A1)
(A2)
(A3)
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Table A1. First-Stage Estimation Results of the 2SLS 
Variable Estimated Coefficients Standard Deviation 
Constant 16.649* 2.281 
year1 -2.474* 0.304 
year2 -5.306* 0.613 
year3 -2.457* 0.325 
year4 -2.674* 0.333 
CIFp  -0.091* 0.020 
2
CIFp  0.00026* 0.00004 
RWI  -0.01890* 0.00442 
2RWI  0.00004* 0.00001 
Note: * The coefficients significant at 1%. 
 
The 2R of the regression is 0.9334 and adjusted 2R is 0.9172, indicating a good fit. We developed 
alternative instruments using other exogenous variables such as monthly dummy variables, 
higher orders of CIF price, and RWI. Results are very robust to variation in instruments. From 
the regression results above, we get the fitted value of ( )ln /I D , ^ln ( / )I D . In the second stage, 
we regress the left-hand side of (A3) on 
^
ln ( / )I D . The results are as follows. 
 
Table A2. Second-Stage Estimation Results of the 2SLS 
Variable Estimated Coefficients Standard Deviation 
Intercept -0.579* 0.220 
^
ln ( / )I D  0.860* 0.041 
Note: * means the coefficient is significant at 1%. 
 
The 2R  and adjusted 2R  of the regression are 0.8982 and 0.8957, respectively. Combining the 
results in Table A2 and equation (A3) allows us to obtain σˆ  and αˆ , results reported in Table 
A3. The estimates’ standard deviations are calculated using the Delta method (Greene).  
 
Table A3. Estimated Results of σ  and α  
Parameter Estimated Value Approximate Standard Deviation 
σ  7.12* 2.09 
α  0.64* 0.05 
Note: * means the coefficient is significant at 1%. 
 
We also used nonlinear least squares on the second stage of the estimation; the results were 
nσˆ =7.15 and nαˆ =0.67, quite close to those obtained using 2SLS. 
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Appendix 2. Sensitivity Elasticities of TBTT to Underlying Determinants 
 
 
To measure the sensitivity of the TTBT  to assumptions on unobservables, we hold “observed” 
variables D, I, PD, PUS, and TR constant and obtain the following sensitivity elasticities of the 
TBT with respect to its determinants σ , and α , =(.)ε )ln(
ln
⋅∂
∂ TTBT :  
εσ = 
T
D
T
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∂=  < -1. 
Elasticity εσ is negative and large in absolute value for small values of σ and converges to 
zero as σ increases. Elasticity εα is negative and in absolute value is the largest of the sensitivity 
measures; it decreases as goods D and I become closer substitutes but remains larger than 1. 
Hence, we can identify a taxonomy of cases. If goods D and I are known to be poor substitutes 
(presumption of small σ), the TTBT  estimate will be very sensitive to the value of σ and 
parameter α and to chosen reference prices and quantities. However, if goods D and I are known 
to be very close substitutes (with presumption of high σ), TTBT  will be much less sensitive to 
pinning down the exact elasticity of substitution, and to reference data volumes D and I. 
Sensitivity to chosen reference prices and preference parameter α will still be important and 
larger than 1 in absolute value.  
We further explore this sensitivity in the empirical application. Reference data used to 
calibrate (7) also matter greatly. To measure the sensitivity of TBT to the chosen reference data, 
we derive similar elasticities with respect to quantity volumes D and I, relative prices PD and 
PUS, and transportation cost RT  and Tariff: 
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and 
=Tariffε
T
T
TBT
Tariff
Tariff
TBT −=∂
∂
ln
ln  < 0. 
The measures εD and εI are equal and opposite in sign and also depend on the value of σ. 
The values decrease in absolute value as D and I become closer substitutes. Sensitivity measure 
εPD is larger than 1 but smaller than εα by a factor of (1-α). It decreases as goods are closer 
substitutes but remains larger or equal to 1. The sensitivity measures 
RT
ε  and tariffε  will be small 
(large) in absolute value if the transportation costs, TR, and the tariff were to be small (large) and 
if the estimate of the TTBT  were to be large (small). Sensitivity to changes in internal 
transportation or transaction costs and the tariff rate will depend on their initial values and could 
be large for protected and poorly integrated sectors. Table A4 provides the estimated elasticities 
of TBTT discussed above and in the main text. 
 
Table A4. Elasticity of TTBT (σ =7.12; α =0.64) 
RT + RIT  
(yen/kg) RT
ε  D 
(tmt) Dε  
I 
(mt) Iε  D
p  
(yen/kg) Dp
ε  Tariff 
(yen/kg) Tariff
ε  
17.5 -0.040 600 0.534 200 -0.370 210 3.64 18.72 -0.156 
35.0 -0.082 640 0.521 280 -0.401 220 3.25 24.96 -0.218 
52.5 -0.129 660 0.515 320 -0.416 230 2.96 31.20 -0.280 
78.3 -0.207 700 0.504 400 -0.444 240 2.74 37.44 -0.343 
87.5 -0.235 720 0.499 440 -0.457 250 2.56 40.56 -0.374 
105.0 -0.296 740 0.494 480 -0.470 260 2.41 43.68 -0.405 
122.5 -0.364 760 0.490 520 -0.483 265 2.35 46.80 -0.436 
Note: Analysis is for year 2000. 
 
(A10)
